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MEASURJNG THE SOCIAL COSTS AND
BENEFITS AND IDENTIFYING THE VICTIMS
OF SUBORDINATING SECURJTY INTERESTS
IN BANKRUPTCY
Steven L. Harris & Charles W Mooney, jr.t

I NTRO D UCTION

In re cent years, so me legal scholars have questio ned th e utility
and fa irness of security interests and the favorabl e trea tment afforded
se curity interests in bankruptcy. More r ecently, a few have made concrete proposals for subordinating security interests to tort and other
claims in bankruptcy. Unlike m any earlier th eore tical explorations of
se cure d d ebt, the subordina tion pro posals acknowledge that evaluating th e effects of affording pri ority to secured claims in bankruptcy
turns on the answe rs to a number of difficult empirical qu estions. As
of yet, however, none of the subordination pro ponents has addressed
these ques tions in any detail.
In this Article, we suggest several approach es for quantifying the
major so cial costs and ben efits likely to r esult from ado ption of a subo rdin ation proposal. In particular, we fo cus on the costs of contractions in the amount of cre dit that would be exte nded if a
subordina tion pro posal were enacted into law. We also co nsider
claims tha t affording priority to secured claims in b ankruptcy promotes ineffici ent, less prudent conduct.
I
THE S u B O RDI NATI ON PRO POSALS

Since 1994, no one h as seriously question ed th a t at least some
secured transactions provide b enefits that offse t any costs imp osed on
a debtor 's unsecured creditors. 1 One finds evidence of this r ecogni-

t The authors are, respec tive ly, Professor of Law, Chi cago-Kent College of Law, and
Professor of Law, U niversity of Pennsylva ni a Law Sch ool. T h ey serve as Repo rters fo r the
Draftin g Committee to Revise U niform Co mme rcial Code Arti cle 9. The views expressed
in this Articl e a re not n ecessarily th ose of th e Drafting Co mmi ttee o r il<> sponso rs- th e
Ameri can Law Institute and the Natio n al Confere n ce of Commi ssion ers on Unifo rm State
Laws. T h e autho rs than k David Carlson, Ri cha rd Hasen , Ri chard McAdam s, Randal
Picke r, Eric Posner, and Paul Shu pack for th e ir hel pful com m e nl<;.
l
Paul Shupack sh o uld be credited 'vith an ea rly exp lanati on of this insigh t. Paul M.
Shupac k, Solving the Puzzle of Secured T ransactions, 41 RuTGERS L. REv. 1067, 1093-11 21
(1989) .
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tion in at least three of the articles that appeared in a symposium issue
of the Virginia Law Review in 1994. 2 One benefit probably is the most
obvious: security can facilitate extensions of credit that creditors
othenvise would not make, and debtors can use the credit extended to
create wealth. Stated othenvise, the institution of secured credit is not
necessarily harmful to unsecured creditors as a class. For example, secured credit that enables a debtor to pay unsecured creditors for
goods and services or that reduces a debtor's risk of insolvency can
benefit those creditors. Consider, as well, that those business debtors
that become insolvent while leaving material debts unpaid are, we suspect, a distinct minority. The net effect of secured credit on unsecured creditors is an empirical Issue that remains to be
demonstrated conclusively. 3

2
David Gray Carlson, On the Efficiency of Secured Lending, 80 VA. L. REv. 2179, 2181-98
( 1994); Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr. , A Property-Based Theory of Security Interests:
Taking Debtors' Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REv. 2021, 2025-47 (1994); Lynn M. LoPucki , The
Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REv. 1887, 1892-1923 (1994). Volume 80:8 of the
Virginia Law Re-view, in which th ese articles appear, contains the papers and commentary
delivered at a 1993 conference in Charlottesville commemorating the comme ncement of
the project to revise UCC Article 9.
3
In their recent article, Lucian Bebchuk a nd Jesse Fri ed acknowledge th e central
role of empirical questions concerning the costs and ben efits of secured credit. Lucian
Arye Bebchuk &Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy,
105 YALE L.J. 857, 91 3-29 (1996). In our article, we expl ained:
In the absence of empirical data it is . . . impossible to conclude
whether giving security generally transfers wealth from unsecured creditors to
secured c reditors. Research that focuses only on creditors of debtors that
actually become insolvent cannot possibly answer th e question; everyon e
knows th a t collateral provides a comparative advantage to the se cured creditor in that situation.
Harris & Mooney, sujJTa note 2, at 2036 (emphasis added). In his recent study, Steven
Schwarcz refined our point in arguing that secured credit often is beneficial to unsecured
crecli tors:
This Article ... adopts a new term, "class Pare to e ff1ciency," r e fle c ting
that the proper unit of analysis is the class and not the individual. A transaction is class Pare to efficient if it is Pareto effi cient wh en viewing each class
of person s affected by th e class of transactions as a single collective person. . . . Class Pareto efficie ncy is th erefore a useful way of assessing th e
policy impact of an action on affected groups, such as the policy impact of
secured credit on unsecured creditors.
New money secured credit appears to be class Pareto efficient, and
therefore efficient from a policy standpoint .... Unsecured creditors as a
class [are) b e tter off beca use the availability of secured credit increases
debtor liquidity and therefore increases the expec ted value of unsecured
claims.
Steven L. Scbwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankrup!L}, 47 DuKE L.J.
(forthcoming Dec . 1997) Uuly 3, 1997 manuscript at 62-63, on file with authors); see also
Ron ald J. Mann , The Role of SRcured Credit in Small B11siness Lending, 86 CEo. LJ. (forthcoming 1997) (Feb. 24, 1997 manuscript at 45-47, on file with authors) (expressing doubt that
secured financing is materially adverse to the interests of unsecured creditors).

rm;· ·
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This Part offers a brief overview of three articl es that argue m
favor of subordinating secured claims to tort claims and certain other
claims.
In his 1991 article, David Leebron explored proposals to eliminate limite d liability for corporate shareholders. 4 The kernel of his
analysis recognized that limited liability permits corporations to extern alize risk, with the result that corporations engage in behavior that is
inefficient-i.e., too risky. 5 Tort victims bear the risk and costs of this
n egative externality. 6 Leebron also pointed out that the same result
occurs by virtue of the treatment of d ebt in insolve ncy proceedings,
inasmuch as unsecured debt receives pari passu treatment with tort
claims. 7 And, h e explained, the priority afforded to secure d claims
exacerbates the problem. 8 Consequently, h e called for the subordination of both secured and unse cured claims to tort claims on effici ency
grounds. 9
Th ere are both useful insights in and powerful arguments against
Leebron's proposal. For present purposes, however, two points are
sufficient. First, Leebron's proposal is designed to provide incentives
that will induce optimal (efficient) risk and care on the part of commercial actors. It is not his purpose either to increase compe nsation
to tort victims or to m aximize recoveries by other unsecure d creditors.
Although Leebron's conclusions have been cited by those who find
fault with the existing secured-credit regime on distributional
grounds, to Leebron's normative principle is efficie n cy, not "fairn ess"
or "distributive justice." Second, Leebron d oes not ap pear to take seriously the possibility that unsecured creditors might benefi t from affording priority to se cured claims. 11
4
David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, T mt Victims, and C1editms, 91 Cou; M. L. REv.
1565 ( 1991) (suggesting, but ultimately rt>jecting, the idea) .
'>
Id. at 1570-74.
6
See id. a t 1574, 1600-05.
7
! d. at 1637-40.
8
ld. at 1646-49.
9
Id. at 1650 . Leebron was not the first to suggest this possibility. See H e nry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Towa·rd Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Cmpomle Tmts,
l OO YALE LJ. 1879, 1902 & n.66 (1991) (suggesting, bu t ultimately rej ecting, the idea).
lO
See LoPucki , sujJra n ote 2, at 1888-89 ("The ins titution of sec uri ty has a ... bad
re p utati on. Its most persistent image is that o f fam ilies forc ed from home or farm th rough
fore closu re. Most noneconomists wish tha t thin gs could be different. v\'e are rootin g for
the und erdog, whi ch means we are rooting against securi ty. ") (footno te omi tted).
1l
On e might think th at so long as the security granted does not exceed the
valu e tra nsfe rre d to th e d e b tor, th e tort victim d oes not lose , and indeed
might gain. But as Alan Schwa rtz has d emo nstrated , this proposition is d ubious and d epe nds on the unrealistic ass umption that th e funds will be invested in a project that is risk free or yields re turns th at are n egatively
corre la ted with the other businesses of the borrower.
Leebron, supra n ote 4, at 1646-47 (citing Alan Schwartz, A Theo1 y of Loan Priorities, 18 .J.
LEGAL STUD . 209, 228-34 (1989)). As David Carlson h as poi nted o ut, Schwartz's model

·.~
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In his Virginia Law Review article, Lynn LoPucki built on Leebron's analysis in urging the subordination of security interests to tort
creditors in bankruptcy. 1 2 Like Leebron, LoPucki grounded his proposal largely on the argument that forcing debtors to internalize the
costs of injury to others will induce debtors to reduce the amount of
tortious injury they cause. 13 He argued that affording priority to tort
and surprised, consensual, unsecured creditors would cause secured
creditors to monitor debtors in a way that would make debtors behave
more carefully and therefore commit fewer torts. 14 LoPucki also suggested, as did Leebron, that current law, which affords security interests priority over tort claims, permits the debtor to externalize its
costs. 15 As the proportion of a firm's assets provided by debt increases, the proportion invested by the shareholders decreases,
thereby reducing the shareholders' risk and placing the risks on creditors. By enabling secured creditors to receive the firm's assets ahead
of tort creditors, current law eliminates any incentive for secured creditors to monitor the safety of the debtor's operations and products.
This, the argument goes, results in less care and more torts. 16
Although Leebron explained that the pari passu treatment of consensual unsecured creditors and tort claims has the same, but less pronounced effects, 17 LoPucki did not advocate subordination of all
contractual, non tort claims to tort claims .
Unlike Leebron, LoPucki confronted countervailing considerations, including th e proposed system's impact on the cost and availability of credit. 18 But LoPucki resolved the empirical problem to his
satisfaction by imagining a market-based solution: tort priority insurance- a product that insurers would develop and offer in response to
demands from secured parties wishing to insure themselves against
loss of their collateral to tort claimants. 19
always assumes tha t the proceeds o f secured loa ns imm ediate ly disappear. David Gray Carlson, Secured Lending as a Zero Sum Game 21 -22 (1997) (unpublish e d m a nuscript, on fil e
with auth o rs).
12
Lo Pucki , supra no te 2, a t 1908-14. Lo Pucki a lso urged subo rdination of security
inte r ests to certain unsecured cl aims h e ld by co nsensual, nontort creditors. !d. at 1947-63.
Asse rting tha t th e risks imposed by the ir debto rs' se cured d e bt unfa irly surprise a materi al
po rtion of co nsensual creditors, h e proposed to subordinate securi ty interes ts to th e claims
of eve ry unsecured conse nsual creditor unless 1) th e secure d party actually brought th e
existe nce of the sec urity interest to th e a ttentio n of th e prospec tive unsecured creditor, or
2) the un securecl credi to r reaso nably should h ave expected the existenc e of th e security
inte rest. !d. LoPu cki's e mpirical assumption about th e widespread surprise of unsecured
creditors seems implausible, at b est.
1 ?.
!d. a t 1897-99.
14
!d. a t 1911-14.
15
! d.
16

See id.

17

Leebron , supra n o te 4, a t 1639-40.
LoPucki, sujJra note 2, a t 1911-12.
!d. a t 191 2-13.

18
19
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In their recent article in the Yale Law journal, Lucian Bebchuk
and Jesse Fried have attempted a more complete analysis of th e effects
oflegal rules governing priority, which generally afford secured creditors priority over tort creditors a1\d other "nonadjusting" creditors, 20
and the potential effects of subordinating security interests to tort and
other nonadjusting creditors' claims. They offer alternative proposals.
One would subordinate security interests generally and fully to all
nonadjusting claims in bankruptcy. 21 The other would treat a fixed,
statutorily imposed fraction (their example is 25 % ) of the secured
claim as an unsecured claim in bankruptcy. 22
Bebchuk and Fried, like Leebron and LoPucki before them, base
their arguments on efficiency. 23 Like LoPucki, and in contrast to
Leebron, Bebchuk and Fried pay attention to positive as well as negative externalities. 24 They identify externalities heretofore overlooked
or given little acknowledgment. 25 However, we qu estion their conclusions and empirical assumptions, especially those concerning economic benefits of credit that would be extended under current law
but that would not be extended were one of their proposals adopted.
Two recent works in progress offer critiques of the Bebchuk and
Fried article. Steven Schwarcz develops arguments that we had previously m ade in the Virginia Law Review to the effect tha t secured credit
20
By "nonadjusting" creditors, th e authors m ea n creditors tha t are un able, or that
rationally d e cline, to adjust the amo unt of credit th ey extend or th e amount th ey charge
for credit to take into account risks imposed b y the crea tion of se curity interests in favor of
other credito rs. Th e category of "no nadjusting" credito rs includes suppliers whose claims
are too small to warra nt m aking adjustme nts and gove rnmental e nti ties holdin g cl aims for
taxes. Be bchuk & Fri e d , supra note 3, at 864-65.
:! l
See id. at 905-09.
:!2
See id. at 909-11. They app td. r to favor th e fi xed-fraction approach. !d. a t 910-11
("Althoug h a rule such as the 75 % f1x ed-fraction rul e would redu ce but not e limina te the
ineffici e n cies identifi ed in this Articl e, it might b e prefe rable to th e adjustabl e-pri o rity rule
because it would create less uncertain ty fo r secured creditors and would be som ewhat easier to administer."). Th e terms "se cured claim" and "unsecured cl aim " have th e m e aning
ascribed to them in th e Bankruptcy Code. See id. a t 859 n.J (c itin g ll U.S. C. § 506(a)
(1994)) . Thus, an oversec ured cre dito r-one wh ose co lla teral h as a value in excess of the
amount of its claim-holds a secured claim equal to th e amount of the claim , wh e reas an
unde rsecu red creditor-one whose claim exceed s th e value of its collateral-h o lds a secured cl aim equal to th e value of th e collateral and an unsecured claim for th e balance.
:!3
H aving identifi ed the effici e ncy costs assoc ia te d with full prio rity, we a lso
h ave considered th e desirabili ty of a differe nt approach-acc ording o nl y
partial priority to secured cl a ims. Our an alysis o f partial pri o ri ty has sh own
tha t such a rul e could elimin ate o r redu ce th ese effici e n cy cos ts-and th a t
su ch an approac h may well b e m o re efficie nt than th e full-p1·iority rul e .
!d. at 934.
24
!d. a t 913-21 (disc ussing n ega tive externali ties o f partial pri o ri ty, i.e. , p os itive e xternalities o f full priority, including in creased inform a ti o n acquisiti o n costs, increased cost of
coordin a ti ng monitorin g e fforts , and re duced fin a ncing for d es irable activities) .
25
!d. a t 895-90 3 (discussing in efficient securi ty interests, disto rted choi ces b e tween
security a nd covenants, distorted inves tm ent and precaution d ecisions, suboptim al use of
covenants, and suboptimal enforce rn e n t efforts).
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can facilitate credit that otherwise would not be extended and that
this credit can create wealth and reduce the likelihood of default. 26
He goes on to explain why firms may be reluctant to give security and
how secured credit can provide needed liquidity for troubled but viable firms that are unable to borrow on an unsecured basis. '2 7 He also
explains in detail how granting full priority to secured credit can increase the expected value of unsecured claims. 28 David Carlson also
criticizes Bebchuk and Fried's conclusions and methodology. 29 He
points out that, notwithstanding their more detailed explanations,
Bebchuk and Fried actually add little to the d ebate on secured
credit. 3 ° Carlson argues that, by positing secured credit as a zero-sum
game and by conflating wealth transfers with social gains and losses,
Bebchuk and Fried make the same mistakes as several earlier
authors.3 1
This brief overview suggests some important implications for
scholarship and law-reform agendas alike. First, the subordination
proposals are based on efficiency grounds. Others may make a normative claim that it simply is "unfair" to elevate secured claims over
those of tort claimants and other nonadjusting creditors, even if the
subordination of security interests were inefficient and would reduce aggTegate
wealth. But that normative claim will dra1-v no support from these
proposals.
Sc hwarcz , supra n o te 3 (manuscript at 18-21 ) .
! d. (m anusc ript at 22-26). Of course , as we stressed in o ur a rticle, p rovid in g liquidity for tro ubl ed firm s is only on e illustra tion of the contexts in whi ch credit wo uld be
available o nly on a secured basis a nd can b e u sed to create weal th. Harris & Mo on ey, supra
n o te 2, a t 2025-45.
'2.0
Schwarcz, supra note 3 (manuscript at 43-58).
Carlso n, sujJra note 11 (m anuscript at 57-79).
!d. (ma nuscript at 58, 79).
Be bchuk and Fried claim to h ave d em o nstrated th a t so me se curity int e r e st~
are effi ci e nt a nd som e are not. Th ey make no a tte mp t to quan tify whether
th e effici e nt securi ty interests predomi:1.ate, or wh e th e r th e in e fficie nt o nes
predomin ate. Indeed, at o n e point they suggest that not eve n fi r ms who
issue sectHity inte rest~ ... know wh eth e r sec urity in te rests will affect th e
m arke t value of th eir own asse t5. Given su ch a lack o f kn o wled ge , th e re is
n o sense in trying to make policy on the basis of wealth m aximization . To
do so wo uld be irres po nsible a nd un sc ien tifi c . .
Neverth e less , in spite of their lack of theo re ti cal g rounding, Beb c huk
and Fried do not hesita te to offer two p oli cy suggestion s. First, they sugg est
th a t sec ured cl a ims b e subo rdinated o nly to th ose credito rs wh o have be en
expose d to uncomp e nsated risk. Second , th ey sugges t that all secured
cla ims be taxed by 25% in bankruptcy pro cee dings in order to make secured credit more risky.
'2.6

'2.7

In effe ct, Beb chuk and Fried started to build a n im·estrnent m o del. In
th e middl e of doing so, th ey fo rgot th e ir pre mises and re\'e rted back to th e
zero sum base lin e, in which all investments h a\'e already taken place. This
unacknowledged shift to premises compl e tely inYa lida tes their findin gs.
Id. (m an u script a t 69-70 , 78).
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Second, th ese proposals suggest a rich field in which legal schol_.,, ars may join hands with those in other disciplin es to study credit.
Testing more fully the empirical assumptions and hypotheses that underlie these and other proposals will be difficult, but may be both rewarding and surprising. It will require more serious consideration of
the direct and indirect economic effects of extensions of credit that
solvent and insolvent debtors in fact repay. And it will require study of
those insolvent debtors that resolve their financial affairs outside of
bankruptcy.
As long as bankruptcy debtors are a small minority not only of all
debtors but of insolvent debtors as well, narrowly focusing only on
bankruptcy debtors will teach little about the full effects of secured
credit. Bankruptcy rules have consequences outside bankruptcy, especially in the process of credit extension. No one could believe that
everything in the credit markets would remain constant under subordination rules except that secured creditors would hand over money to
unsecured creditors in bankruptcy pro ceedings. In particular, we are
wary of assertions that professional secured creditors oppose the subordination pr0?osals because the proposals' adoption would take
wealth from them and give it to unsecured creditors. Imposition of a
subordination regime may, in fact, increase the aggregate losses that
secured creditors suffer in insolvency proceedings. But secured creditors are likely to react to subordination rules by taking the new rules
into account when assessing their risks and making business decisions.
Once the dust settles, :>ecured creditors may find that their returns
have not been adversely affected.
There is one way, of course, that some secured creditors could
lose under the subordination proposals. Secure d creditors that can
exploit a market position to extend secured credit profitably under
current law might lose profits under a regime that would materially
contract their extensions of credit. Their alternative sources of investment may be less profitable. However, the bigger losers would be
thos e debtors that would receive less funding and those others that
would, consequently, be prevented fro m entering into transactions
with those debtors. If this account is accurate, th en those who view
curren t law as "pro-secured creditor" necessarily must view current law
as even more "pro-debtor."~>:-2
3:-2 See, e.g., Anthony Saunders & Ingo Walter, An notated Project Outline, Proposed
Conventio n on Security Interests in, and Transfers an d Leasing of, Aviation Mobil e Equipment: Economic Im pact Assessment 30-33 Unn e 25, 1997) (unpu blished manuscript, on
fil e with authors ) (estimating, based on stock marl..et claw, that recent clarifica tions to
Bankruptcy Cod e § lllO , which afford s certain financers and lesso rs of transportation
equipment enhanced rights to be paid currently or to take possession of the eq uipment,
increased the capitalized future earnings for the four airlines included in the Standard &
Poor' s airline index (i.e., debtors and lessees) by $442 .8 million , or 4.65% of the previous
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II
EsTIMATI N G THE So c iAL CosTs OF THE SuBORDINATION
PROPOSALS

In this Part we consider how two significant effects of the subordination proposals might be quantified. We suggest a research agenda,
not definitive conclusions. We first consider the costs of contractions
of credit extensions, including the costs imposed on debtors' unsecured creditors, that would result from adopting the subordination
proposals as measured against the resulting benefits for unsecured
creditors (i.e., larger distributions). Second, we consider the argument that subordinating secured claims would reduce a negative externality that current law creates-the inducement of debtors to
externalize risk, resulting in more risky behavior.
A.

Costs of Credit Contractions and Benefits of Increased
Distributions

Our article in the Virginia Law Review explains how secured credit
may benefit unsecured creditors generally, although it has the effect
of subordinating unsecured claims against debtors that enter bankruptcy. 33 One major benefit is the facilitation of credit that creditors
otherwise would not extend. We h ypothesize that adopting the subordination proposals would materially reduce credit available to distressed businesses, and that the costs of the credit contraction would
swamp the benefits of increased distributions in bankruptcy for the
promoted classes of creditors. 34
In his work in progress, Steven Schwarcz explains why credit
might be available to an insolvent debtor only on a secured basis and
equity value of the airlin es). These authors also o bse rved: "It should be noted th a t the
upgrade of airlin e d ebt and its com m ensurate reductio n in financin g costs attributable to
the propose d Convention fo r no n- U .S. a irlines is likely to be significa ntly grea te r th a n the
upgrad e attr ibuta ble to th e Bankruptcy Refo rm Act's clarificatio n of Section 1110 in the
United States. " ld. (m anuscript at 33 ). T he Conve ntio n to which th e authors refe r is the
Draft Co nve ntion on Internatio nal Interes ts in Mo bile Equipme nt, which would cover security interests in and le ases of high-valu e m o bile e quipment such as a ircra ft, railroad rolling stock, sa tellites, and ships. Th e Inte rnatio n al Institute for the U nifi ca tion of Private
Law, in Rom e , sponsors wo rk o n th e Co nvention .
33 In b rief, our Vilginia Law Review articl e ex plain s th at d ebtors m ay h ave access to
mo re credit unde r th e existing legal regim e , wh ich validates secure d tra nsactions, tha n
they would if all credit were unsecu red. vVe argue tha t the addi ti ona l cre dit m ay increase
the expected va lue of unse cured claims by, in ter alia, reducing th e probability o f the
d ebtor's default, providing a source o f re paym e nt to un secured credito rs, a nd e nabling the
d e btor to re main in busin ess a nd co nclude future tra nsactions. Harris & Moo ney, supra
n o te 2.
34
It is implausibl e to assume th a t risk-ne utral lende rs would be willin g to exte nd the
same amount of credit, but with an in creased ri sk p re mium . As Paul Shupack has explained, "[a] t some level of risk, th e model [of secured lending] mus t allow oth e rwise riskneutral creditors to cease le nding." Shu pack, sujJra n ote 1, a t 1097.
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how 2. subordination regime "would create an economic disincentive
that would cause many potential lenders simply to refuse to make
loans to debtors." 35 Contractions in available credit might also come
in the form of loans made in a smaller amount. The conventional
wisdom in the credit markets supports our hypothesis that the contraction of credit is likely to be material, inasmuch as subordination of
a security interest would diminish the collateral value on which a secured lender could rely. 36
Estimating the aggregate costs of credit contraction that one could expect from adopting the subordination proposals would require an initial estimate of the aggregate amount of credit contraction. Upon settling
on an estimate of the latter sum, it would then be possible to estimate,
by using a multiplier based on a variety of economic assumptions, 37
the aggregate costs. These costs then could be compared with the
aggregate amount of increased distributions in insolvency proceedings (or
otherwise) that would flow from adoption of the subordination proposals.38 In each case, assumptions as to the precise subordination
formula-e.g., subordinate secured claims to tort claims, subordinate
secured claims to the claims of nonadjusting creditors, or treat 25% of
the secured claim as unsecured-would influence the estimates. In
reality, we doubt that anyone could generate a meaningful estimate of
the actual amounts of these costs and benefits for the entire United
States (or any other) economy. For example, even with complete and
accurate data on distributions in bankruptcy, how would one accurately take into account costs arising out of informal negotiations in
the shadow of bankruptcy priority rules? Although developing a
35

See Schwarcz, supra note 3 (manuscript at 36).
See, e.g., Joe Rizzi, Gauging Debt Capacity, CoRP. C.'>.SHFLOW, Feb. 1994, at 33, 34 ("A'iset-based lending can increase the debt capacity of middle-market or non investment-grade
firms with strong tangible asset bases but low or volatile cash flow streams. Standard advance rates against eligible accounts receivable, inventory and net property, plant and
equipment are 80%, 50% and 40%, respectively."); see aLm Jim Embree, Commercial Loan
Risk Ratings for Collateral and Control, Bus. CREDIT, July-Aug. 1995, at 12 (explaining how
collateral is rated accm·ding to its liquidity, marketability, and value, and how the rating
affects the availability of credit). Some disagree with the conventional wisdom. See Ronald
J. Mann, Strate,!,ry and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt, 96 MicH. L. REv. (forthcoming
Nov. 1997) (Apr. 29, 1997 manuscript at 81-82, on file with authors) (reponing that 1) an
insurance company executive was not confident that adoption of a fixed-fraction subordination proposal applicable both in and out of bankruptcy would have a significant longterm effect on the amount of credit extended, and 2) a banking executive predicted that
adoption would have no effect whatsoever on bank lending).
37 One might assume, for example, that the supply of credit is sufficient to provide an
appropriate amount of credit to creditworthy borrowers.
38 As with an estimate of wealth losses arising out of contractions of credit, an estimate of wealth gains from increased distributions in insolvency proceedings would require
assumptions concerning the uses to which the distributions would be put. ·wealth transfers
alone do not represent wealth increases and do not have any necessary efficiency
implications.
%
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meaningful estimate of aggregate amounts may not be possible, estimating the relative amounts of the costs of credit contraction and benefits of increased distributions in identified samples may be. There
are several plausible approaches.39
Initially, it will be necessary to identify market segments in which
anecdotal evidence and common knowledge indicate that secured
credit plays an important role. Examples are the markets for financing agricultural production, the acquisition of commercial aircraft
and other equipment, credit secured by financial assets such as securities (at both the wholesale and retail levels), securitization transactions, and credit for small commercial, retail, and industrial
businesses. The next step will be to identify a manageable sample.
Possibilities abound. Some industries may collect data concerning
th eir members that is available for the asking. One also could use
questionnaires and interviews to survey relevant samples of market
participants. Analyses of the records of a sample of lenders with large
and diverse portfolios also might be useful. Those records and portfolios also would support the study and analysis of data concerning the
borrowers who do not d efault, r ecoveries from those who do d efault,
the incidence of default, denials of credit, lending policies involving
loan-to-collateral ratios, results of nonbankruptcy workouts, and the
like .40
Another approach would draw from available data to create manageable predictions .4 1 For example, assume one identifies a market
segment with 1000 firms, each holding assets valued at $125,000 and
!19
Among the ap proac h es we do not explore is to compare data from an economy
with a functional personal property security regime to data from an economy without on e.
For example , recent 'tudies b y the World Bank predict that Bolivia's adoption of an effective personal prop erty security law would cause interest rates to d ecrease and cred it availabili ty to increase, th e reby resulting in a social gain equal to as much as two p e rcent of the
Bolivian gross dom es tic product. See Heywood W. Flei sig et al., L egal Restrictions on Security
Interests Limit Access to Credit in Bolivia, 31 INT'L LAw. 65, 70 ( 1997); see also Saunders &
Walter, sujJm note 32 (m anuscript at 33) (discussing the favorable economic impact on
n on-Uni ted States airlin es that would result from improving the effec tiveness of personal
property security laws).
40
In his recent study of 74 problem loans origin a ted by three lende rs, Ronald Mann
suggest-> that, "[g) ive n th e relative infrequ e ncy o f b ankruptcy and liquidati on even in the
universe of distresse d loans," th e changes that would result from adoption of the subordination proposals "do not seem se rious enough to h ave serious effect'i in th e massive unive rse of cases in the market for loan origin ati on. " Mann, suj;ra n ote 36 (manuscript a t 80).
Give n th e diversity of lenders and credit marke ts, the possibility that a subordin ation regime might not materially affe ct the extension of credit by some flna nce rs in some marke t<;
is in no way inconsi stent with the possibility that such a regim e wou ld m ateria lly affect
exi sting or future flna ncin gs by the same financ e rs in other markets or by those or oth e r
fin ancers in other marke ts.
4 1
The Federal Reserve Board's na tional survey of sma ll business financing is likely to
be an important source of data. See Rebel A. Cole et a l. , Bank and Nonbank CompetitionjiJr
Small Business Credit: lc'vidence from the 1987 and 1993 National Surveys of Small Business Finances, 82 F ED. REsERVE BuLL 983, 983-85 (1996).
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having borrowed $100,000 (.8 x $125,000) secured by all its assets.
Assume further that the evidence shows that lenders in this market
segment determine the amount of credit they are willing to extend by
reference to the value of the collateral. 42 Next, assume that, under
normal credit policies that take into account the risks of loss under
the existing full-priority regime, including the de fa cto partial subordination in bankruptcy, lenders have extended secured credit to the
firms in the identified market segment in an amount equal to 80% of
the value of the collateral. 4 3 Subordination rules increase the risk of
loss to secured parties by allocating to competing cre ditors some or all
of the collateral value. Thus, one would expect that under a subordination rule less secured credit would be extended. Assume that a
given subordination rule, whose details for the most part need not
concern us,44 decreases the value of collateral to secured lenders in
the identified market segment to such an extent that they would be
·willing to extend credit in an amount equal to 70 % of the value of
42
Th e use of loan-to-value ra tios a ppears widespread ·with respec t to bo th r eal property and pe rsonal pro pe rty collateraL In some instan ces , statutes se t maximum lo an-tovalue ra tios. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. L'\WS ANN. ch. 175, § 63 (West 1987) (generally limiting
mortgage lo ans by insurance compani es to 75% of th e fair marke t value of the real propert:y securing the loan). In other credit markets, lenders set th em. See, e. g. , P ETER H. WEIL,
AssET-BAsED LE!':DI!':G 237 (1 989) (describing the "borrowing base" fo r a n inventory financing as "a percentage of th e value of th e inventory a t the lower of cost or marke t") . The
Comptro ll e r of the Currency, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Syste m, Federal
Deposit [nsurance Corporation, and Office of Thrift Supervision h ave adopte d a uniform
rule req u iring each supe rvised instituti o n (national bank, state ban k member of the Fede ral Rese rve System , insured state n o nmember ba nk, o r savings association) to ad o pt and
maintain real-property le nding policies th a t establish " [p ] rudent unde n vriting standards ,
including loan-to-value limits." See 12 C.F.R. § 34.62 (b) (2) (ii) (1 997) (Comptroller); id.
§ 208.52(b) (2) (ii) (Fed eral Reserve Bo ard); id. § 365 .2(b) (2) (ii) (Federal De posit Insurance Corp. ); id. § 560.10l(b)(2)(ii) (Offi ce ofThrift Supervisio n ) . Inte ragen cy guidelines
provide supe rvisory loan-to-value limits that an institutio n 's inte rnal limits sh o uld n o t exceed. See, e.g., Interage ncy Guidelin es for Real Esta te Le nding Po licies, id. § 560.101 app.
43
Beb chuk and Fri ed point to th e fact that unde r current law (primarily Ban kruptcy
Code Ch apte r ll) secured claims re ceive a de facto subo rdination (arising out of, fo r example , d e lay, the autom atic stay, unreaso n ably low coll a te ral valuati o ns, etc.). Beb chuk &
Frie d , sujJTa note 3, a t 9 11 -13. But this shows only that the curre nt o bstacles to e nfo rcing
se curi ty inte rests in ba nkruptcy have not entirely eli-rninated the utili ty of colla te ral, as in our
exampl e. On the oth er hand, if cu rrent law were to ex tend a more friendly h a nd to secured claims in bankruptcy, then p erh aps 85% o r 90 % financin g, instead of 80 % , might
have b een m o re appro pria te in the example.
44
O ne d e tail of th e subordin a tio n n1le does co nce rn us. Th e example assum es that,
unde r th e applicabl e rul e , a secured p arty may h o ld a full y sec ured claim in ba nkruptcy.
For exam ple . the rule might permit ho lders of unsecured claims to take colla tera l fr ee of a
security inte rest only to the extent n ecessary to provide them with a spe cified pro po rtion of
the d ebto r 's assets. In contrast, the subordinatio n rules that Be bchuk and Fried proffer
preclud e a cre ditor fro m eve r being fully se cured in bankruptcy. !d. a t 905-11 (explaining
the ex te nt to which a sec ured claim is treated as unsec ured unde r th e "adjusta ble-priority"
and "fix ed-fraction prio ri ty" rules). The adverse co nsequenc es of be ing undersec ured in
bankruptcy lead us to expect that a subordinatio n rule taking th e latter approach would
result in an even greater contraction of credit than we hypothesize in our example .
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collateral. This suggests that each borrower would be likely to borrow
$87,500 (.7 x $125,000), or $12,500 less than under the existing legal
regime, and that, of the $100,000 ,000 in aggregate credit extended
under the existing regime ($100,000/ borrower x 1000 borrowers),
$12.5 million ($12,500/borrower x 1000 borrowers) would not be extended under the subordination rule. 4 5 Now assume that 2%, or 20,
of the 1000 borrowers enter bankruptcy and that the collateral retains
its original value, $125,000. 4 6 Of this value, $37,500 ($125,000 $87,500) would be available for distribution to unsecured creditors.
Of the $37,500, $25 ,000 would have been available under the existing
regime and an additional $12,500 becomes available as a consequence
of the subordination rule. Thus, under this scenario, aggregate secured credit decreased by $12.5 million and the subordination rule
put $250,000 ($12,500/ borrower x 20 bankrupt borrowers) in the
pockets of the unsecured creditors in bankruptcy. 47 The devil is in
the numbers, of course, but resort to reliable data could inform the
example.
The contraction of secured credit in the example would not necessarily result in the contraction of aggregate credit. For example, the
increased debtor equity in collate ral and the operation of the subordination rule in bankruptcy might p ermit the debtors to offset the reduction in secured credit with unsecured credit. 48 We think it
extreme ly unlikely that any increases in unsecured credit would offset
4S
In fact , th e re duction in aggregate cre dit ex tended to the identifie d firms may be
even greater. Some lo ans th a t mig ht be made on th e basis of an 80% loa n-to-valu e ra tio
might not be made at all unde r a p artial subordination regime. For exa mpl e, a firm might
be unable to unde rtake a proj e ct if it is able to borrow $70,000 rather than $80,000. One
could not dete rmine from historical data alone h ow much less credit a le nde r would exte nd under a give n subordination regime. It would b e n ecessary to m ake estimates based
not only on the d a ta but also on the o pinions of credit analysts and ra ting age ncies as to
h ow a spe cified subordination regime would affe ct credit decisions.
46
The assumptio n about collateral value probably is un realistic. Co nve ntional wisd o m is tha t the actual collateral value rea lized in bankruptcy frequently is less than the
preba nkruptcy estimated value . This is one reason wh y lenders ofte n re quire a "cushion"
of collateral value in excess of th e secured debt. vVe m ake th e assumption neverth eless in
order to maximize th e amount that a pa rtial su bordina tion rule wo uld provide to unsec ured creditors, th e reby giving the ben e fit of th e d o ubt aga inst our h yp o th eses. Mo reover, the fact that the value of a p a rticular item or group o f collateral exc eeds the secured
d e bt is no t in consiste nt with a d ebtor's insolve ncy or fi na ncial di stress.
47
More pre cisely, the subordination rul e put no more than $250,000 in the poc ke ts of
unsecured creditors in bankruptcy. The additional amount unsecure d cre di to rs recover
d e pends o n the a mount of administra tive expenses a nd pri o rity claims. See Bankruptcy
Cod e § 726( a ) , 1l U.S.C. § 726(a) (1 994). \:Ve be lieve th a t it is reason able to h yp o th esize
this disparity betwe en th e am o unt of credit co ntrac tion ($ 12.5 million ) and th e in creased
recove ries by unsecured credi to rs ($250,000). Th e assumed le nde rs th a t r e ly o n a loan-tovalue ratio are risk ave rse and would reduce c redit ex te nsions by a n amount g reate r than
that n ecessary to offse t precise ly their expected losses.
48
A reducti o n in th e appli cabl e inte rest rate th a t unsecure d credito rs charge also
might result.
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a material portion of the reduction of secured cre dit. 49 Inasmuch as
secured creditors in the example insisted on reducing th e amount of
available credit, such an increase in unsecured credit would occur
only if the unsecured creditors were materially less risk averse than the
secured creditors. 50
From the perspective of efficiency, one must be concerned not
only about the reduction in the amount of available credit that would
result from adoption of a subordination proposal, but also about the
nature of the projects that firms will refrain from undertaking as a
consequence of the reduction. Thus, Bebchuk and Fried pursue their
subordination proposal even though they agree that it would prevent
certain loan transactions, and thus certain projects, from going forward. In part, they do so on the premise that subordination is "more
likely to prevent the financing of an inefficient activity than an effi49
As the following letter from a Deputy Associate Attorney General demonstrates,
interested segments of the United States federal government appea r to share our intuitions on this subj ect.
This letter responds to Professor Charles Mooney's request for comments on a [subordination ] proposal ....

At the outset, we emphasize th at-perhaps uniquely-we appreciate
the concerns the proposal seeks to address. Th e federal gove rnment is frequently an involuntary, unsecured creditor as a result of its tax, enviro nmental clean-up, pension protection and oth er similar regulatory and
enforcement responsibilities. The prospect of failing busi n esses continuing
to o perate withou t the unen cumbered resources necessary to comply with
obligations imposed unde r the law threatens th e effec tiveness of many important federal and state statutes designed to protect public health ....
The proposed change to the Uniform Commercial Code thus responds
to a serious problem that merits furth er study. Neve rth e less, after conferring with numerous potentially affected fed eral agencies, we have concluded th at this proposal, though admittedly well intended , should not be
adopted . . ..
First, the effect of the proposal on the extension of credit n eeds further study. The proposal could have detrimental effects on many highly
leveraged sectors of the econ omy, such as small business and agriculture.
Secured len ders ... might eithe r red uce lin es of cred it, demand greater
security, exact higher ra tes of interest or impose a co mbination of a ll three.
T o the exten t tha t lenders react by demanding greater collatera l, even
more property of a bo rrower might become encumbered .... Ironically,
unsecured creditors could be harm ed to th e extent that businesses that
could otherwise survive and generate profits with the help of secured credit
are forced out of business or into bankruptcy.
Th ese economi c burdens would be imposed on all borrowers, not only
those who present the types of risks that the proposal seeks to address. As a
result, the proposal, if adopted, may well reduce the availability of p riyate
credit to some sectors of the econ omy.
Letter from Francis M. Allegra, Deputy Associate Attorn ey General , United States Department of justice, to Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Director , The American Law Institu te
(March 17, 1997) (on fil e with auth ors) (footno tes omitted).
s o We realize, of course, that both the risk aversion and lending policies of creditors
vary. See Mann, supra note 36 (manuscript a t 55-59) (arguing that differences in risk preferences are the most plausible explanation for new lenders' willingness to exte nd credit to
debtors whose existing lenders have decided to terminate the lending relationship).
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cient one," and that their subordination scheme would prevent the
financing of efficient activities only in "rather rare" situations. 51
It is instructive to see why Bebchuk and Fried think this might be
true. Although their discussion, 52 which centers around a numerical
example, is far from clear, Bebchuk and Fried's argument appears to
run as follows. They hypothesize that under a full priority regime for
security interests, a particular firm can borrow $1,000,000, at an interest cost of $80,000, in order to pursue a project with a "benefit to ...
shareholders equal to $85,000." 53 They also assume that the firm has
nonadjusting creditors that (if they could) would charge a risk premium of $10,000 as compensation for additional risk. 54 Under a partial priority regime, then, they assert that the prospective secured
lender would charge interest of $90,000. 55 They believe that the project must be "inefficient," apparently because it would not be undertaken if the firm were required to compensate all creditors with an
appropriate risk premium. 56 Consequently, they conclude that

Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 3, a t 918, 920.
!d. at 917-21. Bebchuk and Fried's discussion of this example is not the centerpiece
of their article. The discussion is, howeve r, their prin cipal consideration of the effects of
their subordination proposals on investment and contraction of credit, th e principal focus
of this Article.
53
Jd. at 918. The meaning of "benefit to share holde rs " is unclear. Bebchuk and
Fried assum e that the shareholders will use a portion of this "benefit" to pay interest to the
secured creditor. ld. at 918-19. Apparently, then, the term means the n e t expected value
of the project before paying interest to the secured credito r (but after paying interest to
the unsecured creditor).
54
Id. a t 91 8.
55
!d.
56
ld. at 919. The example is troublesome in that the nonadjusting unsecured creditor is the government. vVhy Bebchuk and Fri ed consider the government to be nonadjustin g is uncl ear, given the govern m en t's power to es tablish legal mles that adjust its risk as
eve nts transpire. For example, th e government can e nact a sta tute providi ng th a t every
time a taxpayer grants a security interest, the governmen t au tomatica lly acq uires a lien pari
passu on the encumbered asset to secure tax obligations. The use of the government in
this example is troublesome also because th e ineffici en cy turns on the notion th at, were
th e government able to acljust to the finn's havi ng incurred secured debt, it would not
have become a creditor unless it r eceived a particular rate of return. But what is th e appropriate rate of return for the govern m ent? Finally, th e foresight Bebchuk and Fri ed attribute to th e firm in the example (the firm knows th at it will earn $85,000 if it borrows
$ 1,000,000 to pursue a project and will decline the project if its in terest costs will exceed
that amount) appears in consistent with their (more pl a usibl e) assumption elsewhere that a
firm has no certain knowledge concerning the wealth consequ ences of its actions. ld. at
894-95 (stating that a firm's commitm en t "not to in effici en tly e n cumber [an] asset ...
would require that the firm know in advance that it would be in effici e nt to en cumber
particular asse ts"; it is a "reaso nable ass umpti on that it is difficult to acq ui re this kn owledge
in advance"). In Part II.B we develop our hypothesis that shifts in prio rity a nd liability
rules like those in the subordination proposals are not likely to affect the behavior of
debtors.
51
52

!
I
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projects that firms are likely to undertake under full priority, but not
under partial priority, are inefficient.57
The firm's nonadjusting creditors cannot possibly suffer any
harm from the new secured credit unless the firm in fact becomes
insolvent and fails to pay the creditors' claims in full. They may be
exposed to additional risk, but that risk will be converted into harm
only as to creditors of debtors that actually faiP 8 Indeed, firms that
are not likely to fail (say, 95 %) and that do not actually fail (say, 98 % )
would be $5,000 richer if presented with Bebchuk and Fried's choices
under full priority. Thus, those firms' nonadjusting creditors actually
may benefit from the financing. 59 Furthermore , the creditors of the
firms that are likely to fail (say, 5%) or that do fail (say, 2%) are precisely the creditors that may benefit the most and may have the least
to lose from a full-priority rule.
Bebchuk and Fried address only situations in which nonadjusting
creditors would, if they could, extract a risk premium and in which,
under partial priority, a secured creditor would remain willing to
make a loan in th e same amount, albeit with an additional risk premium. This incomplete vision fails to take account of many other situations, including those in which a secured creditor would refuse to
57
In part because Bebchuk and Fried's example is so unclear, we do not explore its
specif-lcs. However, Carlson analyzes the example under alternative assumptions and argues tha t, unde r e ither alternative , Bebchuk and Fried fail to draw appropriate conclusions
fro m th e numbers they posit. Carlson, supra note 11 (manuscript at 75-79).
~s
See Ste phen R. Perry, Risk, Harm, and Responsibility, in PHILOSO PHICAL Fot:ND.·\TIO:-;s
OF ToRT L\W 5 (David G. Owe n ed., 1995) (explaining that risk is n ot harmful in itself).
The relevant risk and harm relate to nonpayment of claims. However, an awareness of the
risk of nonpayment could poten tially impose some tem porary disutility on a claimant that
even tually is paid in full.
59
See H arris & Mooney, sujJia note 2, at 2028-37; Schwarcz, supra note 3, passim.
Bebchuk and Fried appear to believe, mistaken ly, that the amount of risk premium that
the creditors would have charged if they h ad be en in a positio n to do so nevertheless harms
the no nadjusting credito rs, who are in fact paid in full. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 3, at
894 ("Since the involuntary creditors do not h ave th e opportunity to se t th e size of th e ir
claims to retl ec t th e possibility [i.e., by charging a risk premium] of this $7500 transfer [of
value to a secured creditor] , they would actually be ' hurt' by the creation of th e sec urity
interest .... ") . Mo reover, as Bebchuk and Fried acknowledge, many creditors that they
include in the class of nonruljusting creditors ac tua lly are acljusting, or at leas t impe,feclly
acUustin g, cred itors. For example, no on e can doubt that when a government sets tax rates
it takes into acco unt th e likely unco llectible po rtions of the taxes. Similarly, m a ny trade
creditors with small claims take into account un colle cti ble accounts in se tting the price and
credit terms for th e ir produ cts or se rvices. See id. at 894. Th ey pro tect against loss by
charging th e bad credit risks less and the go od credit risks more than would be the case if
they analyzed the credit risk of each cu stomer. Contrary to Bebchuk and Fried's claims, id.
at 894-95, th ese result-adjustin g creditors are not disadvantaged when th e ir debto rs give
securi ty. Th ere m ay be wealth transfers from the d ebtors with better credit (wh o may pay
inappropriately high interest rates) to those with poo rer credit (who pay inappropriately
lmv rates ), but they do not n ecessarily refl ec t ex ante inefficienci es. Eve n "pure" tort creditors may be positioned to take risk into account in some ways , for example, through decisio ns abou t wh ich products to buy, which areas in which to jog, and which airlines to fly.
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extend credit altogether or would offer to extend a smaller amount of
credit under a subordination regime. Not only is their analysis incomplete, it is unsatisfactory even on its own terms.
Bebchuk and Fried essentially propose to reduce risk by limiting
the secured party's access to collateral in bankruptcy. 5° But if full priority in bankruptcy is wealth-enhancing, then adoption of their proposal will reduce the social benefits. Bebchuk and Fried, like many
before them, proceed on the assumption that externalization of risk is
a priori to be avoided. 61 As Randal Picker has explained, however,
whether externalizing risk is a good or bad thing is an empirical question. 62 This is because the social benefits of a project include not only
the return to the producer but also the consumer surplus a project
creates, i.e., the aggregate amount by which the value of the project to
consumers exceeds its cost to them. Unless legal rules designed to
prevent externalization of risk take the consumer surplus into account, some activities having a positive net social value will not be undertaken. As Picker explains:
As soon as we abandon the assumption that [an entrepreneur]
can capture all of the social benefit of her activities, we must also
abandon our policy of full internalization .... Put differently, because some benefits from the project will almost necessarily be externalized, we need to allow some risk to be externalized. 63

Stated otherwise, complete internalization of risk-the premise underlying Bebchuk and Fried's argument-has no necessary connection with wealth maximization.
B.

Effects of Full Priority for Secured Credit on Externalization
of Risk and Debtor Behavior

As we outlined in Part I, several subordination proponents have
argued that affording full priority for security interests in bankruptcy
leads to suboptimal, inefficient precautions against risk. 64 We hypothesize that neither affording full priority to security interests nor moving to a subordination scheme has or would have a material effect on
the level of risk and precaution that debtors undertake. The following discussion explains our hypothesis and considers the prospects for
acquiring empirical evidence to support it.
60
Bebchuk & Fried, sujna note 3, at 859-67. The only way to eliminate the risk compl e tely wendel be to make all security interests ineffective. vVe know of no one who advocates this approach.
61
!d. at 863-66 & n.26.
62
Randal C. Picker, Externalization 3 (Jan. 10, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with authors).
63
!d. at 4.
64
See supra Part I.
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Leebron examines the effects of a firm's capital structure and the
Bankruptcy Code's priority rules on the externalization of tort risk in
a world of limited shareholder liability, as under current law. 6 5 H e
offers three examples, each involving a biotechnology firm that holds
assets of $100 million and faces a small risk that a catastrophic event
will result in $200 million in tort liability. 6 6 H e first assumes that th e
firm's capital structure consists of $100 million in equity and no
debt. 67 Inasmuch as the equity holders are at risk for no more than
$100 million under a limited-liability regime, the firm has externalized $ 100 million of potential tort liability. 5 8 Leebron then posits that
th e firm has only $50 million in equity and has borrowed $50 million
from a financial creditor. 69 In this case, the $ 100 million in assets
would be distributed pro rata to the holders of the $250 million of
claims. 70 The tort claimants would r eceive $80 million, yielding a
$120 million shortfall, and the financial creditor would receive $20
million, yielding a $30 million shortfall. 71 Compared to the first example, th en, an additional $20 million of tort liability has bee n extern a lized. 72 Finally, Leebron varies the second example by assuming
th at the $50 million of financial d ebt is fully secured. 7 " Under tha t
scenario, the financial d ebt would be paid in full, leaving $50 million
of assets for the $200 million tort claimants and resulting in a $ 150
million shortfall or $ 150 million of tort liability that h as been
externalized. 74
Leebron's observations are not unconventional in economic analysis. As th e potential tort claims absorb more risk an d the e quity holders fa ce less, the stakes shrink for th e latter. This is said to reduce th e
d eterrent effects of tort liability and the pre cautions firms will take to
avoid it. Apparently, Leebron thinks tha t the hypothetical debtor that
acquires $50 million of secured debt instead of $50 million of equity

65
Leebron , supra note 4, at 1636-49. Unde r a le gal regi me imposing unlimited shareh o lder li abili ty, Leebro n obse rves th at the bankruptcy priori ty rul es wo uld be irreleva nt, as
th e firms could n o t externalize tort risk unless th e ir asse ts were insufficien t to sa tisf}• th e
cl aims. !d. a t 1637-38 & n .2 16.
66
67

!d. at 1639.
!d.

6H

See id.

I)~)

! d.

70

See id. at I 639-40.

71

See id. at 1640 . Lee bron a ppa rentl y d oes no t d eem releva nt th e fa ct th at until th e

tort liability actu ally materializes, the continge nt liability would no t be valu ed at $200 mil-

li on, but at a fractio n of th a t amount, represe ntin g th e likelihood th at th e liability would
ac crue.
72

See id.

73

!d.

74

See id.
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will engage in behavior that is 50% more risky (the ratio of $150 of
externalized risk to $100 of externalized risk) .7 5
Leebron advances four reasons that support subordinating financial creditors (both secured and unsecured) to tort claimants: (i) financial creditors can more easily diversify losses than tort creditors,
(ii) decreasing the negative externality created by corporate limited
liability will cause more efficient management decisions and "fewer
unjustified tort risks," (iii) a subordination rule "would restore capital
structure neutrality" for tort risks, and (iv) "creditors will have an increased incentive to monitor corporate tort risks." 7 6 We focus here on
the second and fourth reasons, which together address incentives for
firms to alter their behavior and take sufficient precautions against
causing injury. 77 Leebron concludes that modifying bankruptcy priority rules by subordinating financial claims, including secured claims,
to tort claims would reduce tortious behavior as well as increase assets
available to satisfy claims. 78 The additional assets would result from
financial creditors' monitoring assets. 79
Leebron's conclusions necessarily depend on an unstated assumption that contemporary tort law has a deterrent effect on solvent
firms with no financial creditors-those whose shareholders have the
most at stake. 8 0 But Leebron's assumption, which he leaves both unstated and unexamined, is problematic at best. Although no one
75
vVould it follow th a t if Leebron 's hypo thetical debtor had only $5 million in equity
and $5 million in debt, it would be ten times less careful than a d eb tor with $50 million in
debt because it would have less to lose ? Leebron does n ot explain wheth e r h e is making
o nly rel a tive comparisons, vi ewing externalized debt as it relates to total asse ts o r total
eq uity. We also note in passing that Leebron 's hypothe tica l firms a re likely to diffe r materially in res pects o ther than their capital structures. Reasons other than fortuity or whimsy
likely are responsible for o n e finn having no debt and anoth er firm ha\ing debt equ al to
50% o f its total assets.
76
ld. at 1643 .
77
As for th e first reason, we note only th a t adjusting th e priority of claims against an
insolvent debtor seems unlikely to b e th e most effective o r efficie nt metho d of spreading
losses.
78
Id. at 1643-50.
79
See id. a t 1G44-45.
80
Le ebron (as well as LoPucki, Bebchuk, and Fried, who followed h;m) fail ed to examine th e ope ration of a nd justifications for tort liability. An o th e r advoca te of tort cre dito r priori ty, however, has re cognized that the prio rity d e bate cannot ignore the basis for
to rt liability itself and the ope ration of the liability sys tem in practice . See Andrew Price,
Note , T ort Creditor Su.j;etp riority and Other Proposed Solutions to Corporate Limited Liability and
the Problem of h,\:ternalities, 2 C Eo . .iYI.ASON L. REv. 439 ( 1995).
This paper assumes that the Am e rican tort law syste m functions efficie ntly. Therefore, this paper assumes th at th e tort creditor p ro ble m poses
a real proble m which n ee ds a solution beyond a ch a nge in the ton law
sys tem. However, it is quite possible that the tort credito r proble m o nl y
exists because of misince ntives in the American tort law system . In tha t
case, it m ay be unreasonable to impose the costs of the fo!lm,ing proposal
on th e busin ess co mmunity, when a less expensive solution may be fo und in
to rt reform.
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doubts that the potential for tort liability has some deterrent effects, 81
the standard economic account of tort liability rules, based on externalization of risk and deterrence, has been roundly criticized and substantially discredited. Professor Stephen Sugarman's critique is
particularly trenchant. 82 Sugarman identifies two cognition-related
weaknesses in the deterrence argument. He explains that many actors
are uninformed of both the law (which will not surprise torts teachers) as well as the facts necessary to apply it. 83 As Sugarman points
out, no one could really expect market actors to understand fully
either the details of the liability rules or the particular kinds of behavior that violate those rules. 84 Individuals-on their own account or as
managers of firms-simply cannot determine with reasonable certainty whether particular conduct will create liability. Thus, not only
do solvent firms commit torts, but in many cases, incurring the liability is not in the interest of the tortfeasors. With hindsight, Ford might
have been well advised to take additional precautions against dangerous gasoline tanks in Pintos. Taking additional precautions might
have been in the best interests of Ford's management and shareholders alike. But how would Ford have been confident about the quantum of risk or that a range of precautions would be either inadequate
or excessive? Sugarman further explains that, even when individuals
and organizations recognize and act upon a risk, often they are incompetent to achieve success. 85 He also rebuts the argument that uncertainty itself necessarily leads to precaution.
ld. at 440-41 (footnote omitted). Price recognized that before one can reach the point of
actually advocating the subordination proposals to lawmakers, one first must defend successfully the efficiency of the tort system. Having failed even to recognize this point, the
subordination proposals obviously have not yet met this burden.
81
See Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tmt Law: Does Tort Law Real(\'
Deter~. 42 UClA L. REv. 377, 378, 390-423 (1994) (setting forth a moderate form of the
deterrence arg·ument-tort law provides some meaningful deterrence, but much less than
economists' formulae suggest).
82
Sn:PHEN D. SucAR~1AN, DoiNG AwAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY L\w 3-24 (1989).
Sugarman also critically examines the other commonly asserted accounts of tort law, principally compensation-based and justice-based rationales. !d. at 35-49, 55-68. Sugarman is
not alone in his skepticism about deterrence theory. See, e.g., lzHAK ENGL\RD, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ToRT LAW 43-44 (1993); John A. Siliciano, C01porate Behavior and the Social f<_jjicienry of Tort Law, 85 MrcH. L. REv. 1820, 1820-22 (1987). Skeptics of the efficiency of
existing tort law as a deterrent are not limited to those writing outside the law-and-economics tradition. See, e.g., .Jason S. Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of Efficiency in
Tort l~aw, 87 CoLL"-"1. L. REv. 1385, 1392 ( 1987) (proposing a system of higher liabilit-y
standards and higher penalties in order to accommodate errors by decisionmakers "in interpreting the standard, or in resolving the factual issues," which, under current law, result
in nonliability for some who fail to comply with the legal standard and liability for some
who do comply).
Sc> SuGARMAN, supra note 82, at 6-9.
84
!d.
S!'>
!d. at 8-9. Sugarman also identifies other factors that undermine the deterrent
effect of tort law: (i) the tendency to discount threats of liability, (ii) the high stakes of
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[F] or most potential defendants, liability insurance
has largely
vitiated this argument. Besides, many parti es will simply ignore the
tiny possibility of a crushing financial loss in the way that people or
companies ignore the chance that they might be killed or destroyed
by an unexpected natural disaste r. Alternatively, if th ey dwell on
this risk, people are apt to develop socially undesirable defense
strategies or to exercise excessive caution and fail to engage in socially beneficial activities. Finally, even if enterprises and individuals were to try to respond to an inde terminate likelihood of
crushing liability, they would not know what amount of precaution
to take. 86

1
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In sum, n either firms nor the individuals who manage them are the
fully informed, rational actors tha t Leebron would hop e them to be.
If the threat of liability under the rippled surface of law and fact
generally serves as a poor (or, at best, a crude) deterrent, in part as a
result of the cognitive issues that Sugarman advances, it follows that
tinkering with the edges of bankruptcy priority rules could not possibly provide an effective one. If a firm's m anagement cannot accurately predict the results of taking or failing to take particular
precautions, it is even more unlikely that management could create
ma terial reductions in risk by taking into account the amounts of the
firm 's unsecured debts and secured debt as they relate to the firm's
capital. 87 And if management is not likely to react pre dictably and
accurately to these marginal externalizations of risk, th en the claim
that monitoring by financial creditors will somehow play a meaningful
r ole in direc ting b e havior is virtually self-refuting. 88
po te ntially d ange rous activity, (iii) the like lihood that in fac t only a small penalty will be
exac ted for tortio us behavio r, and (iv) th e effect of liab ili ty iilSuran ce. !d. a t 9-1 8.
Sfi
!d. a t 8. Arguably, Leebron re cognized that un certainty might p lay a ro le in the
a nalysis, but he did not consider it. Lee bron, supra note 4, a t 1636 n .2 12 (acknowle dging
that his arti cle does not address the p ossible effects of fact-fin ding un certainty).

87
See Schwartz, supra note 81, at 379 ("[L]egal eco n o mists [should] de-emphasize
th e ir efforts to fine-tune liability rules in orde r to achieve pe rfect d ete rre nce. Give n the
imp recision in th e processes by which to rt liability affe cts behavior, th ese efforts a t finetuning, though inte ll ec tually cha lleng ing, a re likely to b e socially irre levant. ") . Tha t to rt
law is such a blunt deterrent d oes not prove the desirabili ty of current law, which generally
provides for full priority of security interests. However, it illustrates that any differen ces in
de te rrenc e be twee n current la\v and th e subordination pro posals would be trivial. \Ne reemphasize that we do n ot qu es tion tha t m a nage rs of firms a ppreciate the potential fo r to rt
li ab ili ty and take precautions based on tha t appreciation. v\'hat we ques tio n is the predicti on that the shifts in priority rules contempla ted by th e subordin atio n proposals wo uld
m a terially affec t ac tual be h avio r. Alth ough leverage, wh e ther secured or unsecured, m ay
cre ate an opportunity for m anagers to ex ternalize risk, we doubt tha t managers in fact
co uld accurate ly calcula te, co mpare , and take account of these margin al ex tern a li za ti o ns
of risks.
SH
We reserve for another day a ny comment on th e asse t m o nitoring that Leebron
co ntemplates fina ncial creditors will provide under a subordination r e gime. vVe note ,
however, tha t anecdotal evide nce suggests that, even unde r the curre nt full-pri ority re-
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We do not dispute that when equity holders, management, or fin ancial creditors have much at stake, the level of precaution and monitoring may be materially more significant than when they have little
at stake. What we question, however, is whe ther variations in the prospects that third parties will be required to absorb tort liability can b e
translated into reliable and predictable variations in behavior. ~ 9 Perhaps Leebron, LoPucki, Bebchuk, and Fried should focus th eir concerns on the continued operation of businesses whose owners and
managers may have re latively little to lose, such as insolvent or n early
insolvent firms. Professor Siliciano makes th e point well:
[T] ort reform holds limited potential for correc ting the problems
caused by evasive be h avior. New rules generate new evasions. And
although complia n ce may increase marginally with each expansion
of liability rules, such improvements are likely to be offset, at least in
part, by the de creased efficiency of transac tions designed to avoid
th e new rules . Moreover, eve n with global rul es, tort's basic m ech anism for controlling conduct-the threat of fu ture liability-is inherently limited. The effec tiveness of such a final threat ultima tely
d epends on whether the ac tor has some thin g to lose. But tort law is
powerless to guarantee that actors will want to, or be able to, stay in
business. Put more crudely, the law is powerless to ensure that all
actors make enough money so that th ey are concerned about th e
prospect of losing it through liability judgments. Thus, even if tort
law could proscribe all lesser evasions , it can do little to alte r th e
conduct of en terprises e ntering th e final , natural refuge of
insolve ncyY 0

We do not take lightly efforts to curb the problems associated \Vith the
operation of undercapitalized and insolvent firms. Neverth eless, we
suspect that it is extremely unlikely that adjustme nts in the priority
rules for secured d eb t would provide an effective remedy for this
gime, secured creditors are ha rdl y indifferent abo u t wh e th e r th eir debtors in cur ton
lia bility.
89
\'l'e also question wh e th e r inte rnali zing tort costs necessarily m ax imi zes wealth.
Traditional economic analyses, like those undertakt 1 by Leebron, supra note 4, LoPucki.
supra note 2, and Bebchu k & Fried , supra note 3, propose to deter through tort law all
conduct that causes a loss to victims that is greater than the costs of preventing or spreading the loss. However, this analysis is deficient because it fai ls to take account of a ll th e
soc ial benefits of the tortious con duct. See Picker, supra note 62, a t 3-6.
90
Siliciano, supra note 82, at J 859 (footnote omitted) . LoPucki recently e laborated
on the va rious means by wh ich judgment-proofin g strategies can be ac hievedund e1· longstandin g legal prin ciples. Lynn M. Lo Pucki , The Death of Liability, 106 Y ALE LJ. I , 14-38
(1996). The issu es of (1) wheth e r Am e rican busin esses have begun to utilize judgmentproofing stra tegies with in creasing frequency and (2) wh e th e r th ose businesses are likely to
continue to use those strategies in the future h as been th e subj ect o f some debate. Compare
id. (arguin g th at judgment-proofing has become in creas in gly commonplace and is like ly to
become even more so in th e future) with ]amesJ. \Nhite, Ignoran t a nd Unasham ed ( 1997)
(unpublished manuscript, on fi le with authors) (arguing tha t widespread judgmen t-proofin g by commercial firm s is on ly theoretically possible).

1370

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:1349

problem. 91 A more likely candidate for reform is the most obvious
source of responsibility for perpetuating insolvent firms' operationsChapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Empirical testing of our hypotheses concerning the behavioral effects (or lack thereof) of both current law and a subordination regime
will be enormously difficult. 92 One initial approach that we intend to
explore is the examination of relevant literature and data from the
cognitive sciences, decision theory, and management studies. 93 In a
recent paper, Cass Sunstein has made a compelling argument for further behavioral research in the analysis of law, and in particular in the
economic analysis of law. 94 We also might consider a more forensic
study of data concerning actual debtors that have and have not incurred material tort liability. At this point, we can note only our pessimism about ascertaining likely behavioral effects of capital and debt
structure from such data. We contrast this pessimism with our considerably more optimistic views about demonstrating the likely effects of
a subordination rule on the availability of cre dit. In addition to the
availability of more accessible and relevant data, we expect to find that
the bases for decisions concerning requests for extensions of credit
from professional creditors are substantially more standardized, form alized, and memorialized.
91
Stated o th e rwise, we hypothesize that the positive externaliti es that Leebro n ,
Lo Pucki, Bebchuk, and Fried would expect from adopting a subordinatio n proposal would
be minor.
92
See Silicia no , supra note 82, at 1821-22.
[The soc ial efficien cy] model of tort law posit-; th a t produce rs wh o might
oth e rwise face in ad e quate incentives to act with care will , if saddled
through li ability rules vvith the costs of injuries caused by defec tive products, see k to reduce such costs to optimal leve ls in order to remain
compe titive ....

Indeed , the narco tic effect of th e social effi cie n cy mode l o f tort is so
strong tha t one easily forget~ that it is simply a m o d el, and on e that has
never bee n empirically tested .... [T]he most compre hensive study of corporate res ponses to to rt liability found that the ac tual operation s of the tort
syste m, ra th e r than e nco uraging producers to take o ptimal ca re, in stead
produced o nly an "indistinct signa l" la rgely devoid of useful guida n ce.
!d. (footnotes omitted). Th e study that Pro fessor Silicia n o relies upon is G EO RGE E .\ DS &
P F T F.R REUTER , THE l!'ST. FO R C1v. JesT., D ES IGNI:-\C S A FE R PROlW CT S-C ORPORr\T E RES PO:-\S ES TO PRODU CT lL\B!LITY LAw AND REc u t.A Tro:--: (198:1) . Professor Sili c iano obse rved
th a t " [t]esting of the mode l m ay be impossible" and ex pressed doubt wh e ther "the e nd
res ult of such effi cie ncy-e nh an cing moves will be a syste m capable o f o ptimi zing product
safe Ly.'' Siliciano, sujJra note 82, at 1821 n .4 (citing Willi a m M. Land es & Richard A. Posne r , A Positivf &anomie Analysis of Products L iability, 14 J. L EGAL STUD. 535, 551-53 ( 1985)
(concluding that courts move from less effi cie nt to more e fficient rules as circumstan ces
di cta te) ) .
~) 3
See AJbert v\'- Chau & J am es G. Phillips, l:Jfects of Perceived Control UjJon ·w agering and
Attributions in Comfm!er Blackjack, 122 J. G EN . P s YC IIOL. 253 (1995 ) (compa ring probabili stic
and cognitive the ories of risk-taking behavior).
94
Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. Cr-11. L. REv. (forthcoming 1997).
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CoNCLUSION

We have sketched our hypotheses concerning tlvo significant aspects of proposals to subordinate secured claims to tort and other
claims in bankruptcy: (i) the social costs of contraction of credit that
might attend adoption of the subordination proposals, and (ii) the
effects of adopting the subordination proposals on the externalization
of risk and the (claimed) attendant increases in precaution. We also
have outlined our current thinking about how to obtain empirical evidence to test our hypotheses. Our reflections have taken the subordination proposals on their own terms, based on their stated goals of
enhancing efficiency and maximizing wealth. But the empirical investigation that interests us may suggest other normative considerations
that adoption of the subordination proposals would implicate.
Consider the demographics of the group of debtors for which
adoption of the subordination proposals would most likely cause reductions in extensions of credit. For example, data may confirm that
small businesses (and, accordingly, minority-owned businesses) would
disproportionately comprise that group. 95 Many observers would see
that fact as support for a normative case against the subordination
proposals, even if the proposals were demonstrably sound on efficiency grounds. Certainly those findings would explain the nearly
universal lack of support for the subordination proposals in the current revision of UCC Article 9.
As a political matter, the subordination proposals have no realistic prospects for widespread support and adoption. Entrepreneurship
is an indelible feature of the American social fabric. Even assuming
that hiking the price of admission to the business marketplace would
promote efficiency, so that only those with substantial unleveraged
capital could afford to participate (a dubious assumption), manyperhaps most-would shrink from the prospect. In the end, the
9.5
Conventional wisdom holds that smaller businesses are more likelv to obtain secured credit than larger businesses. The resulL'i of the recently published survey, conducted by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, bears this out. Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finances
(visited Sept. 24, 1997), <http:/ /www.bog.frb.fecl.us/boarddocs/smveys>. The size of a
business bears a high correlation with the presence of collateral in f-Inancing the business,
with smaller businesses more likely to give security. Telephone Interview with Rebel A.
Cole, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (May 29, 1997). Minority ownership of a business also correlates highly with size; minority businesses generally are smaller.
!d. It is plausible to hypothesize that the reduction of credit following adoption of a subordination scheme would fall disproportionately on businesses owned by women and members of racial minorities. \Ne have not tested this hypothesis here, and the data do not
necessarily prove this hypothesis. Our point is more basic. Proponents oflaw reforms that,
if adopted, would reduce available credit should take into account the likely victims of the
reductions. vVe do not claim here , however, that current law is necessarily the optimal
means of supporting small businesses.
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needs and aspirations of the market participants-from the small
businesses on Main Street to the economic engines on Wall Streetwill prevail. 96

I

l

I

96
Any serious approach to Jaw reform, as opposed to scholarship for its sake alone,
cannot ignore the political landscape. See Eric A. Posner, The Pohlica.l Economy of the Bankmptcy Reform Ar:t of 1978, 96 MICH. L. REv. 47 ( 1997) (analyzing the legislative and intell ectual history of the Act from a public choice perspective); Mark J. Roe, A Political Theary of
American CorjJomte Finance, 91 CoL. U M. L. REv. 10 (1991) (observing that American co rporate ownersh ip and managem ent can be explained only by unde rstanding prevailing political influences, such as concerns abo ut permitting financi al institutions to invest in and
control industrial firms). Well intention ed as they may be , the subordination proposals are
widely seen as a broadside assault on small business. See, e.g., Letter from Francis M. Allegra to Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., supra note 49. We suspect that the data will bear this out.

